An overview of the newly published Australian Election Study survey, offering the deepest publicly available insights into what drove the May federal election results.
The Australian Election Study, a comprehensive post-election survey that sundry political scientists have been conducting after every federal election since 1987, delivered yesterday its report on the May federal election and attendant dataset, which provides results to 316 survey questions from 2070 respondents.
Highlights from the report:
• Questions on the most important election issue reinforce what has long been evident from an array of sources, namely that the cost-of-living was far the most salient issue in the minds of voters. Of note is that only 7% of Coalition voters named health as the most important issue, compared with 18% for Labor voters and 16% for Greens. It was also the biggest area of Labor advantage, 50% rating Labor as having the best policies compared with 14% for the Coalition. Out of ten issues canvassed, the only one on which the Coalition was favoured (by 28% to 22%) was national security. A graph on page six representing results over six elections going back to 2010 shows this was the first at which Labor had the advantage on economic management and taxation.
• Peter Dutton had the worst popularity rating of any leader out of 14 elections since the series’ inception, scoring an average 3.2 on a ten-point scale, substantially defeating the record of 3.8 set by Scott Morrison in 2022. Anthony Albanese’s 5.3 ranked tenth out of 28.
• Party alignment, which has in fact been quite a bit stickier in Australia over time than in other liberal democracies, maintained a progressive decline evident since 2010, with a new peak of 25% saying they do not identify with any political party.
• Support for the Coalition has been tanking among millennials (born 1981 to 1996), which the survey authors interpret as a rebuff to the assumption that voters naturally gravitate to conservatism as they age. The Coalition has maintained its high level of support among the nation’s diminishing flock of boomers. Conversely, no clear generational effect is evident in the decline in the Labor primary vote. Gender gaps remained much as they have since the end of the Howard era, with the Coalition vote nine points higher among men than women and the Labor vote five points lower.
• While satisfaction with democracy is more resilient than recent survey evidence indicates in the United States and United Kingdom, only 74% said they would have voted without compulsory voting, which was supported by 67%, both results being the lowest going back to 1996. One Nation voters were far the most distrustful of government, with 74% holding that those in government “usually look after themselves”, with other categories of voter ranging from 24% to 48%.
• Support for republicanism is on the rise (56-44 in favour), while lowering the voting age to 16 is wildly unpopular (13% support, 87% oppose). Forty-two per cent favour four-year terms, compared with 30% for the status quo; 36% favour term limits for parliamentarians with 31% opposed.
• “Trust in US to defend Australia” collapsed to 54%, far the lowest going back to 1993, and quite a lot lower than during the first Trump administration (69% after the 2019 election). The perception of China as a security threat soared from 18% in 2016 to 32% in 2019 to 55% in 2022, but has now moderated to 41%.
My own preliminary fiddling with the data has focused on the phenomenon of gender differences being especially pronounced among younger voters, as men weaned on Joe Rogan if not Andrew Tate rebel against the feminist and progressive orthodoxies that shape the worldview of most young women. A report in The Guardian cites polling data showing support for Donald Trump was 16% higher among men than women in the 18-to-29 cohort, more than double the effect among the electorate as a whole. Nor was this specific to the United States, with data indicating young men were twice as likely as young women to vote for Reform UK and Germany’s hard right AfD party, and a gap of fully 25% in support for South Korea’s conservative People’s Power party.
Unfortunately, the AES dataset suffers the usual problem of having had a much higher response rate among the old than the young, such that reducing it to under-30s is of limited value. Nonetheless, I offer below age-by-gender breakdowns encompassing the four age cohorts typically used by opinion pollsters for the Labor two-party vote and the Greens primary vote, the latter providing the most striking manifestation of the age-related gender difference. The red and green dots indicate vote share using the weightings provided in the AES, which are placed in the middle of bars recording the spread of the margin of error – these being notably wide in the case of those problematic younger age groups.
Labor’s two-party vote is higher among women than men in each of the four age cohorts, but not remarkably so among 18-to-34 – indeed, the biggest difference is in fact the 17.8% gap for 65-plus, and the outlier the relatively modest 4.6% gap for 50-to-64. The sample for 18-to-34 was low enough that the gender gap, wide as it appears to have been, doesn’t escape the overlap of the error bars, as would be required to demonstrate statistical significance. Conversely, it can be asserted with a high level of confidence that Labor did better among women than men among those aged 65 and over.

By contrast, the Greens primary vote chart indicates gender gaps in the expected direction of clear statistical significance among both the 18-to-34 and 35-to-49 cohorts, beyond which the party’s support is low enough that differences become difficult to discern. Even at the outer ranges of the very wide margins of error for 18-to-34, women outdo men for Greens support by 29.6% to 20.6%, with the probability that the Greens did twice as well among young women approaching 80%.
